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A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF DEDUCTION FOR Σ FORMULAS
ANDRE KORNELL
Department of Mathematics
University of California, Davis
Abstract. The Σ formulas of the language of arithmetic express semidecidable relations
on the natural numbers. More generally, whenever a totality of objects is regarded as
incomplete, the Σ formulas express relations that are witnessed in a completed portion of
that totality when they hold. In this sense, the Σ formulas are more concrete semantically
than other first-order formulas.
We describe a system of deduction that uses only Σ formulas. Each axiom, an implication
between two Σ formulas, is implemented as a rewriting rule for subformulas. We exhibit
a complete class of logical axioms for this system, and we observe that a distributive law
distinguishes classical reasoning from intuitionistic reasoning in this setting.
Skolem’s theory PRA of primitive recursive arithmetic can be formulated in our deductive
system. In Skolem’s system, free variables are universally quantified implicitly, but in our
formulation, free variables act as parameters to the deduction. In this sense, our formulation
is more explicitly finitistic. Furthermore, most of our results are themselves finistic, being
theorems of PRA. In particular, appending our main theorem to a celebrated chain of
reductions from reverse mathematics, we find that an implication of Σ formulas is derivable
in WKL0 if and only if there is a deduction from the antecedent to the consequent in our
formulation of PRA.
Some mathematicians taking a potentialist view of the totality N of natural numbers or
the totality R of real numbers or the totality V of pure sets reject the validity of classi-
cal reasoning for that structure. Such mathematicians are wary of quantification over an
incomplete totality, in various terms. For example, Weaver analyzes quantification via the
notion of surveyability, the abstract possibility of sorting through the totality [20] [21], while
Feferman expresses the view that only quantification over a complete totality preserves the
definiteness of a property [5] [6], which he variously analyzes as semantic bivalence, or the
expressibility of that property by an operation to the set of truth values {⊤,⊥}. Roughly
speaking, both Weaver and Feferman advocate for the use of intuitionistic logic for formulas
that quantify over incomplete totalities. This attitude goes back to at least Pozsgay [11],
who investigated a variant of ZF in which the law of the excluded middle is postulated only
for formulas whose quantifiers range over sets. We follow these authors in reasoning about an
incomplete structure as a whole, in contrast to an approach that reasons about an incomplete
structure in terms of its completed substructures [8] [9].
The attitude of the present paper is that universal quantification over an incomplete
totality is impossible, meaningless. Completeness is not a formal notion, and there are
conceptual models for which the word “complete” might sensibly be interpreted to opposite
effect. For example, the incompleteness of a totality might be treated modally, with universal
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1
quantification expressible using the necessity operator. However, it is also sensible to call a
totality complete if its elements are all epistemologically accessible in some ideal sense. This
is more or less our interpretation of the word “complete”.
Intuitionistic reasoning is not justified per se, if any of its formulas are meaningless. We
formalize a mode of deduction for the formulas that we take to be meaningful for our under-
standing of incomplete totalities. Our conceptual model is based on ordinary computability:
if we take the totality N of natural numbers to be incomplete, then our meaningful formu-
las are essentially the computably semidecidable predicates. In the general case, we reason
about a structure whose universe is not assumed to be a complete totality. To accommodate
universal quantification over its complete fragments, the structure is equipped with a binary
relation we notate ∈; we require that the totality of points related to any given point of the
structure be complete. This condition is similar in kind to the requirement that equality
relation = be an equivalence relation respected by each formula.
We take all atomic formulas to be meaningful, and we take take the class of meaningful
formulas to be closed under conjunction, disjunction, bounded universal quantification, and
unbounded existential quantification. We allow unbounded existential quantification because
an existential claim does not require epsitemological access to all the elements of universe,
but just to one. The logical complement of an existential claim is a universal claim, which we
take to be meaningless; hence, negation is not one of our allowed connectives. However, we
do take the relations = and ∈ to be abstractly decidable, so the vocabulary of the structures
we consider includes binary relation symbols 6= and 6∈, which denote the complements of
relations = and ∈. Thus, we take the Σ formulas in the language of set theory to be
meaningful in themselves; for finitary set theory, this attitude goes back to Takahashi [19].
For precision, we specify a first-order formula to be a formula built up using conjunc-
tion, disjunction, universal quantification, existential quantification, and implication, start-
ing from the atomic formulas, including the Boolean sentence letters ⊤ and ⊥. We render the
quantifiers as ∀v : and ∃v : , using the semicolon as a visual separator, with the convention
that quantifiers bind less tightly than each connective except implication. We identify the
meaningful first-order formulas with the Σ formulas defined here:
Definition 1. Let S be a vocabulary consisting of finitary function and relation symbols,
including a distinguished binary relation symbol 6∈. We define Σ(S) to be the class of first-
order formulas in the vocabulary S whose only connectives are conjunction, disjunction,
existential quantification, and universal quantification, with each occurrence ∀v of a universal
quantifier quantifying a formula of the form v 6∈ t ∨ φ with v not free in t. We abbreviate
this formula as ∀v ∈ t : φ.
The usual definition of Σ formulas allows negation where it does not occur above an
unbounded existential quantifier. Our definition effectively confines negation to literals to
ensure that Σ formulas are positive in their atomic subformulas. Furthermore, we control
which atomic formulas may occur negated by explicitly adding negated relation symbols,
or neglecting to do so. The Σ formulas of the language of set theory are essentially Σ(S)
formulas for S the vocabulary consisting of binary relation symbols =, 6=, ∈, and 6∈. The
Σ formulas of the language of arithmetic are essentially Σ(S) formulas for S the vocabulary
consisting of binary relation symbols =, 6=, <, 6<, 0, 1, +, and ·, where we take < and 6< as
alternative renditions of ∈ and 6∈. In both of these settings, Σ formulas are equivalent to Σ1
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formulas, which are characterized by the additional condition that the only occurrence of un-
bounded existential quantification is at the front of the formula. Generally, this equivalence
requires a collection principle such as
∀t ∈ u : ∃v : φ =⇒ ∃w : ∀t ∈ u : ∃v ∈ w : φ.
Definition 2. Let S be a vocabulary consisting of finitary function and relation symbols,
including a distinguished binary relation symbol 6∈. We define a Σ(S) theory to be a class
of implications φ⇒ ψ, with φ and ψ both Σ(S) formulas.
If φ is a first order formula whose free variables are v1, . . . , vn, we define its universal
closure φ to be the formula ∀v1 : · · · ∀vn : φ. We assume that our variables are canonically
linearly ordered, resolving the ambiguity in the order of the universal quantifiers. If T is a
Σ(S) theory, we define the class T to consist of universal closures of the implications in T .
A model of T is just a model of T in the ordinary sense.
Three arguments form the core of this paper. For each Σ(S) theory T , and all Σ(S)
formulas φ and ψ, we use the cut-elimination theorem to reduce derivations of T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ
in Gentzen’s LK, to derivations of φ ⊢ ψ in LKΣ(T ), a sequent calculus for Σ formulas
that allows cuts according to the axioms of T . Second, we use deep inference to reduce
derivations of φ ⊢ ψ in LKΣ(T ) to deductions in the rewriting system RKΣ(T ). Third, we
establish the soundness of the rewriting system RKΣ(T ) as a consequence of the positivity
of our connectives.
The derivations we consider are all finite objects, so we will assume that the vocabulary S
is finite. With eye towards applications in the foundations of mathematics, we claim many
numbered results from the theory Σ01 -PA [15, remark I.7.6], also called IΣ.
Theorem 3 (IΣ). Let S be a finite set of finitary function and relation symbols, including a
distinguished binary relation symbol 6∈. Let T be a finite set of formulas that are implications
between Σ(S) formulas. Let φ and ψ also be Σ(S) formulas. The following are equivalent:
(1) There is a derivation of the sequent T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ in the sequent calculus LK.
(2) There is a derivation of the sequent φ ⊢ ψ in the sequent calculus LKΣ(T ).
(3) There is a deduction from φ to ψ in the rewriting system RKΣ(T ).
Parsons’s theorem is the proposition that any Π02 theorem of IΣ is also a theorem of
PRA, so in particular theorem 3 is a theorem of PRA. We refer here primarily to the first-
order formulation of PRA given in Simpson’s Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic [15,
section IX.3]; Parson’s theorem is a special case of [15, theorem IX.3.16]. Skolem’s original
formulation of PRA is a quantifier-free system; by a standard application of Herbrand’s
theorem, any Π02 theorem of IΣ is also a theorem of this quantifier-free system in the sense
that the theorem provably admits a primitive recursive Skolem function. For each of the
implications (1) ⇒ (2), (2) ⇒ (3), and (3) ⇒ (1), the primitive recursive Skolem function
is implicit in our proof of theorem 3. Thus, we have a primitive recursive algorithm for
reducing derivations in LK with nonlogical axioms from T , to deductions in the rewriting
system RKΣ(T ). Skolem’s PRA is significant as a formalization of Hilbert’s finitism, as
prominently argued by Tait [18]. See example 12 for further discussion of these systems.
Putting the classical completeness theorem through the equivalence (1)⇔ (3), we obtain
the following variant.
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Corollary 4. Let S be any set of finitary function and relation symbols, including a distin-
guished binary relation symbol 6∈. Let T be any set of formulas that are implications between
Σ(S) formulas. Let φ and ψ be Σ(S) formulas. There is a deduction from φ to ψ in the
rewriting system RKΣ if and only if every model of T also satisfies φ⇒ ψ.
This corollary can also be obtained directly via the standard term-model construction,
using the Rauszer-Sabalski lemma [14] in place of the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma.
The deductive system LK is Gentzen’s sequent calculus with the cut rule, except we allow
the Boolean sentence letters ⊤ and ⊥. It is depicted in figure 1. We obtain cut elimination
for the this variant as a quick corollary of the cut-elimination theorem for the original system,
by adding ⊤ and ⊥ to the antecedent and succedent respectively of each sequent in a given
derivation. The cut-elimination theorem is known to be provable in IΣ; see for example the
proof in reference [3, section I.2.4]. Our formulation omits mention of negation, which does
appear in Gentzen’s original system, because a negated formula ¬φ can be rendered φ⇒ ⊥.
For brevity, we have combined the contraction and exchange structural rules of Gentzen’s
original formulation of LK into a single “multiset rule”.
The deductive system LKΣ(T ) is essentially a restriction of LK to Σ formulas, with the
axioms T showing up as cuts in the deduction:
Definition 5. Let S be any set of finitary function and relation symbols, including a distin-
guished binary predicate 6∈. Let T be any set of forumas that are implications between Σ(S)
formulas. The sequents of the deductive system LKΣ(T ) are those of LK, with each formula
a Σ(S) formula. The rules of the deductive system LKΣ(T ) are also those of LK, but with
a cut rule for each axiom φ(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ φ
′(x1, . . . , xn) in T and terms t1, . . . , tn:
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(t1, . . . , tn) Γ
′, φ′(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ∆
′
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′
The resulting system is depicted in figure 2. The rule for implication is automatically ex-
cluded because it produces excluded sequents. Thus, the system LKΣ(∅) is cut-free, and the
system LKΣ({φ⇒ φ | φ ∈ Σ(S)}) has just the ordinary cut rule.
In the rewriting system RKΣ(T ), each cut rule for an axiom of T is implemented as a
rewriting rule. The other rules of the system LKΣ(T ) are likewise implemented as rewriting
rules.
Definition 6. Same assumptions as for definition 5, above. A deduction in the system
RKΣ(T ) is a sequence of Σ(S) formulas, with each succeeding formula obtained from its
predecessor by an inference rule. For each implication φ(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ φ
′(x1, . . . , xn) that is
an axiom of T or a logical axiom in figure 3, and for all terms t1, . . . , tn, the system RKΣ(T )
has the rule
Ξ(P/φ(t1, . . . , tn))
Ξ(P/φ′(t1, . . . , tn)),
where P is a schematic variable in Ξ in place of a subformula, and the slash notation
expresses substitution. The variables in the terms t1, . . . , tn may become bound in the
formula Ξ(P/φ(t1, . . . , tn)), or equivalently in the formula Ξ(P/φ
′(t1, . . . , tn)).
The system RKΣ(T ) is a deep inference rewriting system, so called because its inferences
may be applied to subformulas [17] [2]. The system RKΣ(T ) is very much in the vein of
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Beklemishev’s rewriting system for strictly positive logics [1], with which it shares the unusual
feature that even the the nonlogical axioms of the theory are interpreted as rewriting rules.
The two systems were developed independently of one another.
Proof of (1)⇒ (2). Let S be a finite set of finitary function and relation symbols, including
a distinguished binary predicate 6∈, and let T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ be a sequent derivable in LK, for φ
and ψ both Σ(S) formulas, and T a finite set of implications between Σ(S) formulas. The
sequent T , φ ⊢ ψ is evidently also derivable in LK, so by the cut-elimination theorem, it has
a cut-free derivation d.
By induction, implication can only occur on the left of a sequent in d, and furthermore
the left universal quantifier rule is the only rule that acts on a formula in which implication
occurs. We can adjust the derivation d so that all universal quantifiers above an implication
symbol are placed immediately after the formation of that implication. Formally, we may
define a rank that counts the number of nonclosed implications in d that are in the premise
of a step that isn’t the introduction of a universal quantifier above that implication. By
induction on this rank, we can show that there is a cut-free derivation d′ of T , φ ⊢ ψ in LK
in which all implications are universally closed immediately after their formation.
By simply removing all formulas containing implication from d′, we obtain a derivation
of φ ⊢ ψ in LKΣ(T ): Each segment of d
′ that consists in the formation of an implication
followed by its universal closure is transformed into an application of the T -cut rule followed
by steps in which the premise is equal to the conclusion. These trivial steps may be painlessly
removed. Each formula in the resulting derivation is also a formula of the derivation d′, and
is therefore a subformula of a formula in T ∪{φ, ψ}, in the inclusive sense appropriate to the
statement of the subformula property of cut-free derivations. By induction, each subformula
of a Σ(S) formula is itself a Σ(S) formula, because in every formula of the form ∀v ∈ s : ψ,
the term s is formally in the scope of the quantifier ∀v, so our derivation does consist of
Σ(S) formulas. 
Proof of (2)⇒ (3), forward direction. Let S be a finite set of finitary function and relation
symbols, including a distinguished binary predicate 6∈, and let T be a finite set of implications
between Σ(S) formulas. For simplicity, we first consider the argument for LKΣ(T ) and
RKΣ(T ) without the symbols ⊤ and ⊥. In this case, every sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ in any derivation
in LKΣ(T ) has a nonempty antecedent Γ and a nonempty succedent ∆.
We call a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ of Σ(S) formulas “deducible” if both Γ and ∆ are nonempty and
there is a deduction from
∧
Γ to
∨
∆ in the rewriting system RKΣ(T ). The notation
∧
Γ
abbreviates the conjunction γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn associated from the left, where Γ = γ1, . . . , γn, and
analogously the expression
∨
∆ abbreviates the disjunction of the formulas in ∆.
Fix a derivation in LKΣ(T ) of some sequent φ0 ⊢ ψ0. We show that every sequent in this
fixed derivation is deducible, by Σ1 induction on the length of its derivation. It is sufficient
to show for each rule of LKΣ(T ) that if the premise sequents are deducible, then so is the
conclusion sequent. Before we examine the rules of LKΣ(T ), we observe that the rules of
RKΣ(T ) allow us to commute and reassociate conjuncts (and disjuncts) as follows:
φ ∧ ψ
(5)
=⇒ (φ ∧ ψ) ∧ (φ ∧ ψ)
(4)
=⇒ ψ ∧ (φ ∧ ψ)
(3)
=⇒ ψ ∧ φ
φ∧(ψ∧χ)
(5)
=⇒ (φ∧(ψ∧χ))∧(φ∧(ψ∧χ))
(3)
=⇒ (φ∧ψ)∧(φ∧(ψ∧χ))
(4)
=⇒ (φ∧ψ)∧(φ∧χ)
(4)
=⇒ (φ∧ψ)∧χ
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Using rules (5) and (3) to duplicate and recombine instances of various conjuncts, and
likewise for disjuncts, we find that if Γ ⊢ ∆ is deducible, and Γ′ consists of the same formulas
as Γ, and ∆′ consists of the same formulas as ∆, then Γ′ ⊢ ∆′ is also deducible. This addresses
the multiset rule. If Γ ⊢ ∆ is deducible, we also find that Γ, φ ⊢ ∆ is deducible using rule (3),
and likewise Γ ⊢ ∆, φ is deducible using rule (6). And certainly, φ ⊢ φ is trivially deducible
for any formula φ. This leaves the T -cut rule, and the logical rules.
Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) =⇒ ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be an axiom of T , and assume that the sequents
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(t1, . . . , tn) and Γ, ψ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ∆ are deducible, for some terms t1, . . . tn. We
obtain a proof of the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ in the following way:
∧
Γ
(5)
=⇒
∧
Γ ∧
∧
Γ =⇒
∧
Γ ∧
(∨
∆ ∨ φ(t1, . . . tn)
)
(9)
=⇒
(∧
Γ ∧
∨
∆
)
∨
(∧
Γ ∧ φ(t1, . . . , tn)
)
(0)
=⇒
(∧
Γ ∧
∨
∆
)
∨
(∧
Γ ∧ ψ(t1, . . . , tn)
)
(4)
=⇒
(∧
Γ ∧
∨
∆
)
∨
∨
∆
(8)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨
∨
∆ =⇒
∨
∆
This addresses the T -cut rule.
Only the logical rules remain. If Γ, φ ⊢ ∆ is a deducible sequent then so are the sequents
Γ, φ ∧ ψ ⊢ ∆ and Γ, ψ ∧ φ ⊢ ∆, using rules (3) and (4). The right disjunction rules are
addressed likewise. If the sequents Γ ⊢ ∆, φ and Γ ⊢ ∆, ψ are both deducible, then so is the
sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, φ ∧ ψ:
∧
Γ =⇒
∧
Γ ∧
∧
Γ =⇒
(∨
∆ ∨ φ
)
∧
(∨
∆ ∨ ψ
)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨ (φ ∧ ψ)
The final implication is a distributive law that is known to be equivalent to the distributive
law (9) over rules (3)-(8), which are the axioms of a lattice. The left disjunction rule is
addressed likewise.
If the sequent Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(v/t) is deducible, then so is Γ ⊢ ∆, ∃v : φ, using rule (10). If the
sequent Γ, t 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/t) ⊢ ∆ is deducible, then so is Γ, ∀v ∈ s : φ ⊢ ∆, using rule (13). If
the sequent Γ, φ(v/w) ⊢ ∆ is deducible for some variable w not free in Γ, ∆, or φ, then so is
Γ, ∃v : φ ⊢ ∆:
∧
Γ ∧ ∃v : φ =⇒
∧
Γ ∧ ∃v : φ(v/w)(w/v)
(10)
=⇒
∧
Γ ∧ ∃v : ∃w : φ(v/w)
(11)
=⇒
∧
Γ ∧ ∃w : φ(v/w)
(12)
=⇒ ∃w :
∧
Γ ∧ φ(v/w)
(11)
=⇒ ∃w :
∨
∆ =⇒
∨
∆
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Finally, if Γ ⊢ ∆, w 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/w) is deducible for some variable w not in free in Γ, ∆, φ, or
s, then so is Γ ⊢ ∆, ∀v ∈ s : φ:
∧
Γ
(14)
=⇒ ∀w ∈ s :
∧
Γ
=⇒ ∀w ∈ s :
∨
∆ ∨ (w 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/w))
(15)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨ ∀w ∈ s : w 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/w)
(14a)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨ ∀w ∈ s : φ(v/w)
(14)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨ ∀v ∈ s : ∀w ∈ s : φ(v/w)
(13)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨ ∀v ∈ s : v 6∈ s ∨ φ
(14a)
=⇒
∨
∆ ∨ ∀v ∈ s : φ
The expression
∨
∆ is undefined when ∆ is empty, but in this case the obvious simple
variant of the deduction suffices. Note that this variant proof does not appeal to rule (15)
of RKΣ(T ).
We now consider the argument for LKΣ(T ) and RKΣ with ⊤ and ⊥. A derivation in
LKΣ(T ) that uses the rules for ⊤ and ⊥ may be easily modified to a derivation that does
not use these rules, by adding ⊤ to the antecedent of every sequent and adding ⊥ to the
consequent of every sequent. Applying the previous argument, we obtain a deduction from
⊤ ∧ φ0 to ⊥ ∨ ψ0 in RKΣ(T ); axioms (1) and (2) then yield a deduction from φ0 to ψ0. 
Proof of (3)⇒ (1). Let S be a finite set of finitary function and relation symbols, including
a distinguished binary predicate 6∈, and let T be a finite set of implications between Σ(S)
formulas. For each axiom φ(x1, . . . , xn) ⇒ ψ(x1, . . . , xn) in T , and all terms t1, . . . , tn, the
sequent T , φ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ψ(t1, . . . , tn) is derivable in LK. In fact, it is derivable in the sequent
calculus LI for intuitionistic logic, obtained from LK by requiring that every sequent Γ ⊢ ∆
have at most one formula in the succedent ∆:
φ(t1, . . . tn) ⊢ φ(t1, . . . , tn) ψ(t1, . . . tn) ⊢ ψ(t1, . . . , tn)
φ(t1, . . . , tn)⇒ ψ(t1, . . . , tn), φ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ψ(t1, . . . , tn)
φ⇒ ψ, φ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ψ(t1, . . . , tn)
T , φ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ψ(t1, . . . , tn)
We may similarly derive the sequent T , χ ⊢ χ′ in LK when χ ⇒ χ′ is one of the logical
rules (1)-(15) of RKΣ(T ). In place of appealing to an axiom of T during the derivation, we
apply the corresponding logical rule of LK. For example, for an instance φ ∧ ψ ⇒ φ of rule
(3), we may derive the sequent T , φ ∧ ψ ⊢ φ as follows:
φ ⊢ φ
φ ∧ ψ ⊢ φ
T , φ ∧ ψ ⊢ φ
We may be certain that such derivations exist for all the logical rules of RKΣ(T ), by the
completeness of the system LK; in fact, all these derivations are fairly short. The only such
derivation not in LI is rule (15). An implication ∀v ∈ s : (χ ∨ φ) =⇒ χ ∨ (∀v ∈ s : φ) is
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generally not intuitionistically valid. The other derivations either follow the two-step pattern
of the above example for φ ∧ ψ ⇒ φ, or are depicted in figures 4 – 7.
If a sequent T , χ ⊢ χ′ is derivable in LK, then so is the sequent T ,Ξ(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ(P/χ′), for
any formula Ξ with a single schematic variable P in place of a subformula. We derive the
sequent T ,Ξ(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ(P/χ′) recursively, by following the logical structure of the formula
Ξ. We are given a derivation of T ,Ξ(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ(P/χ′) when Ξ is simply P , and we derive
T ,Ξ(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ(P/χ′) by the weakening rule when Ξ is an atomic formula other than P .
When Ξ is not atomic, we apply the appropriate logical rules. For example:
T ,Ξ0(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ0(P/χ
′)
T ,Ξ0(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ0(P/χ
′) ∨ Ξ1(P/χ
′)
T ,Ξ1(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ1(P/χ
′)
T ,Ξ1(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ0(P/χ) ∨ Ξ1(P/χ
′)
T ,Ξ0(P/χ) ∨ Ξ1(P/χ) ⊢ Ξ0(P/χ
′) ∨ Ξ1(P/χ
′)
All such derivations occur entirely within LI.
A deduction in the rewriting system RKΣ(T ) is a sequence of formulas ξ0, . . . , ξn such that
for each step i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we can find a formula Ξi with schematic variable P, and a rule
χi−1 ⇒ χi of RKΣ(T ), such that ξi−1 is Ξi(χi−1) and ξi is Ξi(χi). Thus, we have shown that
for each step i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the sequent T , ξi−1 ⊢ ξi is derivable in LK. Applying the cut
rule n − 1 times, we obtain a derivation of T , ξ0 ⊢ ξn in LK, and therefore of T ⊢ ξ0 ⇒ ξn,
as desired. 
We presently observe that all three parts of the argument remain sound if we restrict the
systems LK and LKΣ(T ) to sequents Γ ⊢ ∆ having at most one formula in the succedent
∆, provided that we also remove rule (15) from the system RKΣ(T ). Our interest in this
observation is motivated by the fact that the sequent calculus LI, obtained by restricting
LK in this way, is known to formalize intuitionistic reasoning.
Definition 7. A derivation in LI is a derivation in LK each of whose sequents Γ ⊢ ∆ has
at most one formula in its succedent ∆. Similarly, a derivation in LIΣ(T ) is a derivation in
LKΣ(T ) each of whose sequents has at most one formula in its succedent.
Theorem 8 (IΣ). Same assumptions as of theorem 3. The following are equivalent:
(1) There is a derivation of the sequent T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ in the sequent calculus LI.
(2) There is a derivation of the sequent φ ⊢ ψ in the sequent calculus LIΣ(T ).
(3) There is a deduction from φ to ψ in the rewriting system RKΣ(T ) that does not appeal
to rule (15).
Proof. Our proof of the implication (1) ⇒ (2) for theorem 3 begins by fixing a cut-free
derivation of T , φ ⊢ ψ, and then proceeds to control and suppress the formation of the
sentences in T , without altering any succedents. Thus, to conclude that this proof adapts
to the sequent calculus LI, it is sufficient to recall that LI allows the elimination of cuts.
Our proof of the implication (2) ⇒ (3) uses rule (15) of RKΣ(T ) in only one place: to
show that if Γ ⊢ ∆, w 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/w) is deducible, then so is Γ ⊢ ∆, ∀v ∈ s : φ. If a sequent
of the form Γ ⊢ ∆, w 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/w) appears in a derivation in RKΣ(T ), then the sequence ∆
must be empty. In this case, a simplified proof of Γ ⊢ ∆, ∀v ∈ s : φ is available, which does
not use rule (15).
Our proof of the implication (3) ⇒ (1) consists essentially in showing that for each rule
χ ⇒ χ′ of RKΣ(T ), the sequent T , χ ⊢ χ
′ is derivable in LK. The only rule of RKΣ(T ) for
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which the corresponding sequent is not derivable using LI is rule (15). The derivations of
those rules of RKΣ(T ) whose derivations have height greater than 1 are given in figures 4 –
7. 
There is an evident correspondence between many of the rules of LK, LKΣ(T ), and
RKΣ(T ), which runs through all three parts of the argument. The argument remains valid
if we omit the logical rules for a logical symbol such as ⊥ or ∃ from all three formal systems.
However, we cannot omit the rules for conjunction and disjunction in this way, because rules
(3)-(9) of RKΣ(T ) play a structural, as well as a logical, role.
Theorem 9 (IΣ). Same assumptions as of theorem 3. The statements of theorem 3 and the-
orem 9 remain true if we modify the formal systems LK, LKΣ(T ), and RKΣ(T ) by excluding
all formulas containing any symbols from a fixed subset of the symbols ⊤, ⊥, ∃, ∀ and 6∈.
Proof. Examine all three parts of the argument for appeals to the relevant logical rules. 
Recall that Johansson’s minimal logic differs from intuitionistic reasoning in its rejection
of ex flaso quodlibet, the principle that everything follows from a contradiction. It may be
formalized by excluding the logical rule for ⊥ from LI; we call the resulting system LM. In
LM, the symbol ⊥ is treated just as a nonlogical nullary relation symbol. Thus, removing
⊥ as logical symbol, according to theorem 9, and adding it as a nullary relation symbol to
our vocabulary S, we find that derivability in minimal logic corresponds to provability in
LI(T ) without rule (2): ⊥ ⇒ φ.
Corollary 10 (IΣ). Same assumptions as of theorem 3. Additionally, let RIΣ(T ) be RKΣ(T )
with rule (15) omitted, and let RMΣ(T ) be RIΣ(T ) with rule (2) omitted.
(1) There is a derivation of T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ in LK iff there is a deduction from φ to ψ in RKΣ(T ).
(2) There is a derivation of T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ in LI iff there is a deduction from φ to ψ in RIΣ(T ).
(3) There is a derivation of T ⊢ φ⇒ ψ in LM iff there is a deduction from φ to ψ in
RMΣ(T ).
Remark 11. In fact, the statements of theorem 3, theorem 9, theorem 10, and corollary
11 remain true if we exclude the binary relation symbol 6∈, and simply allow unbounded
universal quantification. Here, the bounded universal quantifier rules of the system LKΣ(T )
are replaced with their standard variants,
Γ, φ(v/t) ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∀v : φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(v/w)
Γ ⊢ ∆, ∀v : φ ,
and rules (13), (14), (14a), and (15) of RKΣ(T ) are replaced with simply:
(13) ∀v : φ =⇒ φ(v/t)
(14) φ =⇒ ∀v : φ
(15) ∀v : χ ∨ φ⇒ χ ∨ ∀v : φ
Example 12. The literature contains many formulations of Skolem’s theory of primitive recur-
sive arithmetic that are equivalent in the sense that they deduce the same atomic formulas.
Those that allow Σ00 formulas deduce the same Σ
0
0 formulas, and those that allow Σ
0
1 formu-
las deduce the same Σ01 formulas. Each Σ
0
0 formula can be viewed as a primitive recursive
process for computing truth values; and the formulations that allow Σ00 formulas deduce the
equivalence of each Σ00 formula with the atomic formula formalizing this primitive recursive
9
process. Furthermore, the formulations of primitive recursive arithmetic that allow Σ01 for-
mulas are constructive in the sense that if they deduce a Σ01 formula ∃v : φ, then they also
deduce the Σ00 formula φ(v/t) for some term t. Thus, one might say that the various for-
mulations of primitive recursive arithmetic are equivalent in their Π02 claims. This is exactly
the logical complexity of the inferences treated in the present paper.
Skolem’s original formulation of primitive recursive arithmetic uses just the Σ00 formulas
in the vocabulary of primitive recursive arithmetic, which consists of the equality relation
symbol, the zero constant symbol, and one function symbol for each primitive recursive
process [16]. Goodstein found an attractive “logic-free” formulation, i. e., a formulation
using just the atomic formulas of this vocabulary [7]. In both of these formulations, the
free variables of a deduced formula are implicitly universally quantified, as evident from the
induction rule, which deduces φ(y) from φ(0) and φ(x) ⇒ φ(S(x)). The implication should
be valid for all values of x, or at least those less than y, for the conclusion to be justified.
This implicit universal quantification is absent in the deductions of the systems RKΣ(T ),
in which any free variables may be interpreted as parameters. Thus, these formalizations
of primitive recursive arithmetic are not finitistic in the strict sense of the present paper.
However, this is a technicality. Each such deduction is finitistic if it is read contrapositively:
if the conclusion of a step admits a counter example, then so must on of its premises.
We introduce a formulation of primitive recursive arithmetic as a class PRA of implica-
tions between Σ formulas. The advantages of RKΣ(PRA) over Skolem’s original formulation
are, first, that RKΣ(PRA) is explicitly finitistic in the sense just discussed, and second, that
the language of RKΣ(PRA) includes the quantifiers, enabling a natural expression of finitis-
tic propositions. Glossing this first advantage, any free variables in a deduction of RKΣ(T )
may be read as parameters, rather than as universally quantified variables. Glossing this
second advantage, the bounded quantifiers that naturally occur in finitistic propositions are
expressible by logical symbols of the language of RKΣ(T ), whereas these bounded quantifiers
must be expressed using function symbols in Skolem’s original formulation. Thus, the for-
malization of finitistic reasoning to RKΣ(T ) is more or less direct, whereas the formalization
of finitistic reasoning to Skolem’s original formulation involves some “coding”. The variant
of primitive recursive arithmetic introduced in this paper differs from the original in the
opposite direction to Goodstein’s; his variant is “logic-free” and our variant is “logic-rich”.
The axioms of our formulation of primitive recursive arithmetic are essentially those of the
first-order formulation currently used in the reverse mathematics community. Of course, the
first-order formulation is not in itself finitistic because some of its formulas quantify over the
entire class of natural numbers, which we take to be an incomplete totality in the context
of finitistic mathematics. However, its axioms are essentially Π02, and therefore expressible
as implications between Σ formulas. Theorem 3 implies that any such implication φ ⇒ ψ
deducible in the first-order system is also deducible in the rewriting system RKΣ(PRA).
We adopt the axioms of the first-order system given in Simpson’s standard reference text
[15, section IX.3]; the Σ00 induction scheme must be rearranged slightly to fit the pattern. We
render the distinguished binary relation symbol 6∈ as 6<, revealing its intended interpretation.
We also include its logical complement <, on the intuition that any two natural numbers are
decidably comparable. The resulting system is depicted in figure 9. Combining theorem 3
with Parsons’s theorem and related results in reverse mathematics, we obtain the following
corollary:
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Corollary 13 (IΣ). Let φ and ψ be Σ formulas in the language of primitive recursive arith-
metic, with binary relation symbols <, 6<, =, and 6=. The sentence φ⇒ ψ is deducible in
WKL0 if and only if there is a deduction form φ to ψ in the rewriting system RKΣ(PRA)
whose class of nonlogical axioms PRA is given in figures 8 and 9.
The system WKL0 [15, definition I.10.1] includes the binary relation symbol <. In the
statement of this corollary, we identify each atomic formula s 6= t with the formula ¬s = t,
and each atomic formula s 6< t with the formula ¬s < t.
Proof. In light of the celebrated reduction of WKL0 to PRA [15, theorem IX.3.16], which is
known to be a theorem of IΣ [4, section 4], it is enough to argue that the sentence φ⇒ ψ
is deducible in PRA if and only if it is deducible in RKΣ(PRA). By theorem 3, it is enough
to show that the axioms of PRA given in Simpson’s text [15, section IX.3] are provably
equivalent to the axioms of PRA given in figures 8 and 9, provided that we translate each
atomic formula s < t in the former theory as the atomic formula t .− s 6= 0 in the latter
theory [15, definition IX.3.4].
The axioms of PRA given in figure 8 and 9 are certainly all deducible in the first-order
system PRA. Conversely, referring to [15, definition IX.3.2], the first axiom follows from (14),
the second axiom follows from (12), and the third axiom follows from (9), (10), (13), and
the axioms for equality (1)-(6). The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh axioms in Simpson’s
text are essentially (15), (16), (17), and (18), respectively. Finally, the eighth axiom, the
primitive recursive induction scheme, follows more or less directly from (19).
At first glance, the argument appears complete, but there are easily overlooked loose ends.
First, the formulation of PRA in Simpson’s text treats equality as a logical symbol, while
the rewriting system RKΣ(PRA) does not; the axioms for equality are (1)-(4). Second,
strictly speaking, the two systems have different vocabularies, so we are formally extending
the system in Simpson’s text by definitions for the binary predicate symbols 6=, <, and 6<.
The definition of 6= follows from (5) and (6), and the definition of 6< will similarly follow
from (7) and (8).
We have shown that every first-order order formula deducible in the system PRA in Simp-
son’s text follows provably from the axioms in figure 9. It remains to show that the first-order
formula x < y ⇔ y .− x 6= 0 follows from these axioms. We appeal to induction on y. For
y = 0, one direction of the equivalence follows by (9), and the other direction follows from the
equation 0 .− x = 0, which is deducible in PRA. At the induction step, if x < y ⇔ y .− x 6= 0,
then we deduce
x < Sy
(11)
⇐⇒ x < y ∨ x = y ⇐⇒ y .− x 6= 0 ∨ x = y ⇐⇒ S(y) .− x 6= 0.

Example 14. Our motivation includes the formalization of all foundational positions that
make a distinction between complete and incomplete totalities, equally the finitistic and the
transfinitistic. Having reformulated PRA in RKΣ, we turn to its transfinite counterpart,
Rathjen’s theory PRS of primitive recursive set functions [12]. For PRS, the universe is
the totality of all pure sets, and the vocabulary has a function symbol for each primitive
recursive operation on this totality [10]. Recursion occurs over the well-founded membership
relation ∈.
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If the totality of all pure sets is incomplete, then we should reason about pure sets without
presuming to make claims about objects that do not all exist even in an ideal platonist sense,
i. e., without quantifying universally over the whole totality. Thus, we are led to formalize
our reasoning in RKΣ.
The axioms of Rathjen’s theory [12, section 6] are all Π2, so the theory can be formalized in
RKΣ. However, we provide a superficial reformulation of Rathjen’s theory, which formalizes
set existence principles in terms of function symbols (figure 10). The intention is to present
the theory in full but readable detail, and to emphasize the constructive intuition of the
set existence principles. The nonoverscored function symbols in Rathjen’s formulation are
shorthand notations, not function symbols in the theory’s vocabulary.[13].
While our reformulation of the axioms of PRS is largely superficial, our replacement of
its logic is conceptually significant. In its original formulation, PRS is a first-order system
analogous to the system PRA in Simpson’s text [15, IX.3]. There is no established quantifier-
free variant of PRS, so in this instance, it is not merely a technicality that the deductions of
PRS include formulas that quantify over the incomplete totality of all pure sets.
We now adapt Rathjen’s conservation theorem for PRS [12, theorem 1.4] to our system,
just as we did with the extension of Parsons’s theorem in corollary 13.
Corollary 15. Let φ and ψ be Σ formulas in the language of set theory, with binary relation
symbols 6= and 6∈. The sentence φ⇒ ψ is derivable in KP− + Σ1-foundation + Π1-foundation
if and only if there is a deduction from φ to ψ in the rewriting system RKΣ(PRS), whose
class of nonlogical axioms PRS is given in figures 8 and 10.
The system KP− is defined in [12, section 1], as are the foundation axioms. The foundation
axioms implicitly allow parameters, both in the present paper and in the reference. In the
statement of this corollary, we identify each atomic formula s 6= t with the formula ¬s = t,
and each atomic formula s 6∈ t with the atomic formula ¬s ∈ t.
Proof. We follow the proof of corollary 13. After appealing to Rathjen’s conservation theorem
for PRS [12, theorem 1.4], and to corollary 4, it remains only to show that Rathjen’s axioms
for PRS [12, section 6], together with the usual axioms for equality, imply the same sentences
of the language of set theory as our theory PRS, given in figures 8 and 10. To accomplish
this, we argue that the two theories have logically equivalent extensions by definitions.
In full detail, the argument is tedious but straightforward. Formally, we extend each theory
by definitions of the form F (x1, . . . , xk) = f(x1, . . . , xk), where F is a function symbol of
Rathjen’s theory, and f is a function symbol of our theory. However, to enhance readability,
we will render these definitions indirectly.
Extending our theory to incorporate Rathjen’s theory is the easier of the two extensions.
Our list below matches up with the list in [12, section 6]:
(1) P n,i = P
n
i
(2) Z = S(⊥)
(3) M = C(A,C(A, P 11 , P
1
1 ), P
1
1 )
(4) C = C(S((x3 ∈ x4 ∧ x0 = x1) ∧ (x3 6∈ x4 ∧ x0 = x2)), C(A, P
4
1, P
4
2 ), P
4
1, P
4
2, P
4
3, P
4
4)
(5) F = C(k, g
1
, . . . , g
n
) if F is obtained by composing K with G1, . . . Gn
(6) F = R(C(h, C(U, P n+21 ), P
n+2
2 , . . . , P
n+2
n+2) if F is obtained from H by recursion
It is clear that our theory establishes Rathjen’s axioms for these defined function symbols.
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The definitions for the other extension are similar but more complex. Perusing the closure
properties of primitive recursive set functions [10, 1.3], we see that the functions of our theory
are indeed all primitive recursive, and the proofs of these closure properties in [10, appendix
I] provide definitions for the function symbols of our theory in terms of those of Rathjen’s
theory. Furthermore, the proofs of these closure properties can be readily formalized in
Rathjen’s theory. 
Finally, taking the ∆0-definable function G in the Rathjen’s [12, theorem 1.4] to be the
constant function x 7→ ω, as he suggests doing, we similarly obtain the following variant of
the corollary:
Corollary 16. Let φ and ψ be Σ formulas in the language of set theory, with binary relation
symbols 6= and 6∈. The sentence φ⇒ ψ is deducible in KP− + Σ1-foundation + Π1-foundation
+ Infinity if and only if there is a deduction from φ to ψ in the rewriting system RKΣ(T ),
whose class T of nonlogical axioms is given in figures 8, 10, and 11.
I thank John Burgess, Lev Beklemishev, Joost Joosten, Michael Rathjen, and Stephen
Simpson for their patient replies to my questions.
References
[1] L. Beklemishev, A note on strictly positive logics and word rewriting systems (2015), available at
arXiv:1509.00666.
[2] K. Bru¨nnler, Deep Inference and Symmetry in Classical Proofs, Logos Verlag Berlin, 2004.
[3] S. Buss, Introduction to proof theory, Handbook of Proof Theory, Studies in Logic and The Foundations
of Mathematics 137.
[4] J. Burgess, On the outside looking in: a caution about conservativeness, Kurt Go¨del: Essay for His
Centennial, Lecture Notes in Logic, Cambridge University Press (2010).
[5] S. Feferman, What’s definite? What’s not? (2009), available at
math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/whatsdef.pdf.
[6] , Conceptions of the continuum, Intellectica 51 (2009).
[7] R. Goodstein, Logic-free formalisations of recursive arithmetic, Mathematica Scandinavica 2 (1954).
[8] J. Hamkins and Ø. Linnebo, The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist maximality
principles (2017), available at arXiv:1708.01644.
[9] J. Hamkins, The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism and the universal algorithm (2018), available at
arXiv:1801.04599.
[10] R. Jensen and C. Karp, Primitive recursive set functions, Axiomatic set theory, Part 1, Proceedings of
Symposia in Pure Mathematics 13, no. 1.
[11] L. Pozsgay, Semi-intuitionistic set theory, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13 (1972), no. 4.
[12] M. Rathjen, A proof-theoretic characterization of the primitive recursive set functions, Journal of Sym-
bolic Logic 57 (1992), no. 3.
[13] , personal correspondence (2016).
[14] C. Rauszer and B. Sabalski, Notes on the Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma, Studia Logica 34 (1975), no. 3.
[15] S. Simpson, Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
[16] T. Skolem, The foundations of elementary arithmetic established by means of the recursive mode of
thought without the use of apparent variables ranging over infinite domains, From Frege to Go¨del,
Harvard University Press (1967).
[17] K. Schu¨tte, Proof Theory, Springer-Verlag, 1977.
[18] W. Tait, Finitism, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), no. 9.
[19] M. Takahashi, A foundation of finite mathematics, Publications of the Research Institute for Mathe-
matical Sciences, Kyoto University 12 (1977).
[20] N. Weaver, The concept of a set (2009), available at arXiv:0905.1677.
[21] , Truth and Assertibility, World Scientific, 2015.
13
Logical Rules
Γ,⊥ ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆,⊤
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ∧ ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ, ψ ∧ φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ Γ ⊢ ∆, ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ ∧ ψ
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆ Γ, ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ∨ ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, ψ ∨ φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ Γ, ψ ⊢ ∆′
Γ, φ⇒ ψ ⊢ ∆,∆′
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆, ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ⇒ ψ
Γ, φ(v/w) ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∃v : φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(v/t)
Γ ⊢ ∆, ∃v : φ
Γ, φ(v/t) ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∀v : φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(v/w)
Γ ⊢ ∆, ∀v : φ
Axiom Rule Weakening Rules
φ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ
Multiset Rule Cut Rule
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ′ ⊢ ∆′
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ Γ, φ ⊢ ∆′
Γ ⊢ ∆,∆′
Figure 1. the system LK
For the left existential quantifier rule and the right universal quantifier rule, the variable w
must not be free in Γ, ∆, or φ. For the multiset rule, the sequent Γ′ must consists of the
same formulas as the sequent Γ, and the sequent ∆′ must consist of the same formulas as ∆.
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Logical Rules
Γ,⊥ ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆,⊤
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ∧ ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ, ψ ∧ φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ Γ ⊢ ∆, ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ ∧ ψ
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆ Γ, ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ∨ ψ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ
Γ ⊢ ∆, ψ ∨ φ
Γ, φ(v/w) ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∃v : φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(v/t)
Γ ⊢ ∆, ∃v : φ
Γ, t 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/t) ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∀v ∈ s : φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, w 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/w)
Γ ⊢ ∆, ∀v ∈ s : φ
Axiom Rule Weakening Rules
φ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ
Multiset Rule T -Cut Rule
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ′ ⊢ ∆′
Γ ⊢ ∆, φ(t1, . . . , tn) Γ, ψ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ ∆
′
Γ ⊢ ∆,∆′
Figure 2. the system LKΣ(T )
For the left existential quantifier rule, the variable w must not be free in Γ, ∆, or φ. For
the right universal quantifier rule, the variable w must not be free in Γ, ∆, φ, or s. For
the multiset rule, the sequent Γ′ must consists of the same formulas as the sequent Γ, and
the sequent ∆′ must consist of the same formulas as ∆. For the T -cut rule, the implication
φ⇒ ψ must be an axiom of T .
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(0) φ(t1, . . . , tn) =⇒ ψ(t1, . . . , tn) for φ⇒ ψ an axiom of T
(1) φ =⇒ ⊤
(2) ⊥ =⇒ φ
(3) φ ∧ ψ =⇒ φ
(4) ψ ∧ φ =⇒ φ
(5) φ =⇒ φ ∧ φ
(6) φ =⇒ φ ∨ ψ
(7) φ =⇒ ψ ∨ φ
(8) φ ∨ φ =⇒ φ
(9) χ ∧ (φ ∨ ψ) =⇒ (χ ∧ φ) ∨ (χ ∧ ψ)
(10) φ(v/t) =⇒ ∃v : φ
(11) ∃v : φ =⇒ φ for v not free in φ
(12) χ ∧ ∃v : φ =⇒ ∃v : (χ ∧ φ) for v not free in χ
(13) ∀v ∈ s : φ =⇒ t 6∈ s ∨ φ(v/t)
(14) φ =⇒ ∀v ∈ s : φ for v not free in φ
(14a) ∀v ∈ s : (v 6∈ s ∨ φ) =⇒ ∀v ∈ s : φ
(15) ∀v ∈ s : (χ ∨ φ) =⇒ χ ∨ (∀v ∈ s : φ) for v not free in χ
Figure 3. rules the rewritting system RKΣ(T )
The symbols s, t, t1, . . . , tn denote terms. Implications of the form (1)-(15) are the logical
axioms of RKΣ(T ). The class of logical axioms is closed under legal substitution. Implications
of the form (0) are substitution instances of the nonlogical axioms of RKΣ(T ). For each
implication σ =⇒ σ′ of the form (0)-(15), the system RKΣ(T ) has the inference rule
Ξ(P/σ)
Ξ(P/σ′),
where Ξ is any Σ(S) formula with a single schematic variable P in place of a subformula.
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χ ⊢ χ
χ, φ ⊢ χ
φ ⊢ φ
χ, φ ⊢ φ
χ, φ ⊢ χ ∧ φ
χ, φ ⊢ (χ ∧ φ) ∨ (χ ∧ ψ)
χ ⊢ χ
χ, ψ ⊢ χ
ψ ⊢ ψ
χ, ψ ⊢ ψ
χ, ψ ⊢ χ ∧ ψ
χ, ψ ⊢ (χ ∧ φ) ∨ (χ ∧ ψ)
χ, φ ∨ ψ ⊢ (χ ∧ φ) ∨ (χ ∧ ψ)
χ ∧ (φ ∨ ψ) ⊢ (χ ∧ φ) ∨ (χ ∧ ψ)
Figure 4. rule (9) derived in LI
χ ⊢ χ
χ, φ ⊢ χ
φ ⊢ φ
χ, φ ⊢ φ
χ, φ ⊢ χ ∧ φ
χ, φ ⊢ ∃v : χ ∧ φ
χ, ∃v : φ ⊢ ∃v : χ ∧ φ
χ ∧ ∃v : φ ⊢ ∃v : χ ∧ φ
Figure 5. rule (12) derived in LI
φ ⊢ φ
φ ⊢ v 6∈ s ∨ φ
φ ⊢ ∀v ∈ s : φ
T , φ ⊢ ∀v ∈ s : φ
Figure 6. rule (14) derived in LI
v 6∈ s ⊢ v 6∈ s
v 6∈ s ⊢ v 6∈ s ∨ φ v 6∈ s ∨ φ ⊢ v 6∈ s ∨ φ
v 6∈ s ∨ (v 6∈ s ∨ φ) ⊢ v 6∈ s ∨ φ
∀v ∈ s : (v 6∈ s ∨ φ) ⊢ v 6∈ s ∨ φ
∀v ∈ s : (v 6∈ s ∨ φ) ⊢ ∀v ∈ s : φ
Figure 7. rule (14a) derived in LI
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(1) ⊤ =⇒ x = x
(2) x = y =⇒ y = x
(3) x = y ∧ y = z =⇒ x = z
(4) φ(x, z1, . . . zk) ∧ x = y ⇒ φ(y, z1, . . . , xk) for φ any Σ(S) formula
(5) ⊤ =⇒ x = y ∨ x 6= y
(6) x = y ∧ x 6= y =⇒ ⊥
Figure 8. the axioms for equality and inequality for vocabulary S
(7) ⊤ =⇒ x < y ∨ x 6< y
(8) x < y ∧ x 6< y =⇒ ⊥
(9) x < 0 =⇒ ⊥
(10) ⊤ =⇒ x < S(x)
(11) x < S(y) =⇒ x < y ∨ x = y
(12) S(x) = S(y) =⇒ x = y
(13) x 6= 0 =⇒ ∃y : x = S(y)
(14) ⊤ =⇒ Z(x) = 0
(15) ⊤ =⇒ P ki (x1, . . . , xk) = xi
(16) ⊤ =⇒ C(g, h1, . . . , hm)(x1, . . . , xk) = g(h1(x1, . . . , xk), . . . , hm(x1, . . . , xk))
(17) ⊤ =⇒ R(g, h)(0, x1, . . . , xk) = g(x1, . . . , xk)
(18) ⊤ =⇒ R(g, h)(S(y), x1, . . . , xk) = h(y, R(g, h)(y, x1, . . . , xk), x1, . . . , xk)
(19) ∀x < y : θ(x, z1, . . . , zk) → θ(S(x), z1, . . . , zk)) =⇒ θ(0, z1, . . . , zk)) → θ(y, z1, . . . , zk))
Figure 9. the axioms of PRA
The Σ(S) theory PRA consists of the axioms in figure 8 and the axioms in figure 9. The
vocabulary S is the vocabulary of PRA given in Simpson’s Subsystems of Second Order
Arithmetic [15, section IX.3], together with binary relation symbols 6=, <, and 6<. In axiom
scheme (22), the formula θ(x, z1, . . . , zk) is any ∆0 formula in the vocabulary S. A formula
is ∆0 if both its existential quantifiers and its universal quantifiers are bounded. If φ and
ψ are ∆0 formulas, then the material implication φ → ψ is an abbreviation for the formula
φ˜ ∨ ψ, where φ˜ is the ∆0 formula obtained from φ by replacing each quantifier, connective,
and relation symbol with its dual: ⊥ ! ⊤, ∨ ! ∧, ∃ ! ∀, =! 6=, and <! 6<.
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(7) ⊤ =⇒ x ∈ y ∨ x 6∈ y
(8) x ∈ y ∧ x 6∈ y =⇒ ⊥
(9) (∀z ∈ x : z ∈ y) ∧ (∀z ∈ y : z ∈ x) =⇒ x = y
(10) z ∈ y ∧ y ∈ x =⇒ z ∈ U(x)
(11) z ∈ U(x) =⇒ ∃y ∈ x : z ∈ y
(12) ⊤ =⇒ x ∈ A(x, y)
(13) ⊤ =⇒ y ∈ A(x, y)
(14) z ∈ A(x, y) =⇒ z = x ∨ z = y
(15) ⊤ =⇒ P ki (x1, . . . , xk) = xi
(16) ⊤ =⇒ C(g, h1, . . . , hm)(x1, . . . , xk) = g(h1(x1, . . . , xk), . . . , hm(x1, . . . , xk))
(17) w ∈ y =⇒ f(w, x1, . . . , xk) ∈ I(f)(y, x1, . . . , xk)
(18) z ∈ I(f)(y, x1, . . . , xk) =⇒ ∃w ∈ y : f(w, x1, . . . , xk)
(19) ⊤ =⇒ R(f)(y, x1, . . . , xk) = f(I(R(f))(y, x1, . . . , xk), y, , x1, . . . , xk)
(20) z ∈ y ∧ φ(z, x1, . . . , xk) =⇒ z ∈ S(φ)(y, x1, . . . , xk)
(21) z ∈ S(φ)(y, x1, . . . , xk) =⇒ z ∈ y
(22) z ∈ S(φ)(y, x1, . . . , xk) =⇒ φ(z, x1, . . . , xk)
(23) ∃z ∈ x : ⊤ =⇒ ∃z ∈ x : ∀y ∈ x : z 6∈ y
Figure 10. the axioms of PRS
The Σ(S) theory PRS consists of the axioms in figure 8 and the axioms in figure 10. It
is a variant of the theory PRS introduces in Rathjen’s A proof-theoretic characterization of
the primitive recursive set functions [12, section 6]. The vocabulary S has binary relation
symbols =, 6=, ∈, and 6∈; it has a unary function symbol U , a binary function symbol A, and
function symbols P ik for positive integers k and 1 ≤ i ≤ k; it has a k-ary function symbol
C(g, h1, . . . , hm) for each m-ary function symbol g and k-ary function symbols h1, . . . , hn;
it has a (k + 1)-ary function symbol I(f) for each (k + 1)-ary function symbol f ; it has
a (k + 1)-ary function symbol R(f) for each (k + 2)-ary function symbol f ; finally, it has
a (k + 1)-ary function symbol S(φ) for each ∆0 formula φ(x0, . . . , xk). In this context, a
formula φ is implicitly equipped with a positive integer arity, specifying its free variables
x0, x1, . . . , xk, some of which may fail to appear in the formula. A formula is ∆0 if both its
existential quantifiers and its universal quantifiers are bounded.
(24) ⊤ =⇒ ∃x ∈ N(w) : ⊤
(25) y ∈ x ∧ x ∈ N(w) =⇒ y ∈ N(w)
(26) z ∈ y ∧ y ∈ x ∧ x ∈ N(w) =⇒ z ∈ x
(27) x ∈ N(w) =⇒ ∃y ∈ x : ∀z ∈ x : z ∈ y ∨ z = y
Figure 11. the axioms of infinity
The vocabulary S is extended by the unary function symbol N . The vocabulary S is then
closed under the constructions detailed in the caption to figure 10.
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